Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
2005

Introduction
David J. Seipp

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Contracts Commons, Courts Commons, and the Labor and
Employment Law Commons

SYMPOSIUM: LOCHNER
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INTRODUCTION
DAVID J. SEIPP*

Have we come to bury Lochner, or to praise it? Lochner v. New York,'

decided 100 years ago, gave its name to an era in which judges struck down
popular statutes that regulated hours, wages, and conditions of work, on
grounds that such labor regulations violated a constitutional liberty of contract.
After 1937, Lochnerism and Lochnerizing were more or less uniformly
condemned by judges and law professors alike. Recently, some scholars have
tried to resurrect the Lochner approach, presumably as a way to render much
of the twentieth-century regulatory state unconstitutional.
The Lochner case invalidated New York State's Bakeshop Act of 1895, a
measure passed unanimously by both houses of the state's legislature and
signed promptly by its governor. 2 The statute set minimum standards for
sanitation and a maximum ten-hour work day and sixty-hour week for
bakeshop employees. Joseph Lochner, owner of a small bakery in Utica, was
convicted in 1902 and fined 50 dollars for employing Aman Schmitter to work
more than sixty hours in one week in his shop. New York state courts upheld
the conviction and the validity of the statute. On April 17, 1905, the U.S.
Supreme Court overturned Joseph Lochner's conviction on a 5-to-4 vote.
Justice Rufus W. Peckham's majority opinion held that New York's statute
interfered with liberty of contract between employers and employees in
violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote a forceful and memorable
dissent in which he accused the majority of writing their own economic views
into the Constitution. Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote in his dissent that
the majority had brought under judicial scrutiny matters that belonged
exclusively to the legislature.
Boston University is a good place to consider Lochner in historical and
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constitutional perspective. Two connections come to mind. A principal
architect of Lochner's substantive due process argument, the young firebrand
conservative law professor Christopher G. Tiedeman, was a visiting faculty
member at Boston University when his groundbreaking treatise Limitations of
Police Power was published in 1886. 3 In its preface Tiedeman warned that
"Socialism, Communism, and Anarchism are rampant throughout the civilized
world" because "[t]he State is called on to protect the weak against the
shrewdness of the stronger" (an abomination to a Social Darwinist like him)
and that "the conservative classes stand in constant fear of the advent of an
absolutism more tyrannical and more unreasoning than any before experienced
by man, the absolutism of a democratic majority."' 4 No student evaluations of
his classes have been found. And in the fall of 1906, a year after the Lochner
decision came down, Boston University's dean Melville Madison Bigelow
addressed the law school in these terms: "Freedom of contract proved the
worst kind of delusion; it ran to gigantic monopoly and threatens today,
whether for good or ill I am not concerned as a teacher of law to say, the whole
fabric of equality ....

The economists made a great mistake in their dogma of

freedom of contract, a mistake which has precipitated another conflict, at the
crisis of which we now stand, trembling at the possibilities. . .. -5 While the
rhetoric of fear and trembling has abated somewhat, Boston University's
School of Law faculty continues to present diverse ideological, political, and
methodological views of the law (who is right and who is wrong I am not
concerned as a teacher of law to say).
This conference, hosted by Pnina Lahav, Randy Barnett, Tracey Maclin, and
Andrew Kull at Boston University School of Law, did not devolve into a
shouting match between Lochner resurrectionists and anti-exhumationists.
Revisionism, not revivalism, was in the air. The five principal papers
appraised Lochner from five illuminating perspectives: constitutional
scholarship, federalism, civil rights enforcement, political context, and
historical revisionism. All five papers suggested, in different ways and to
different extents, that at one hundred years' perspective the firestorm over
Lochner may well have died out for now.
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CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORICISM
6

Jack Balkin opened the conference with a series of provocative questions.
Was Lochner rightly decided on the day it was decided? Had it become
wrongly decided at some later stage in history? Will it become rightly decided
again? Balkin did not answer his own questions, but used them to reflect on
his larger view of constitutional historicism. Balkin asserted that the
classification of constitutional arguments as "good" or "bad" changes over
time, and more fundamentally, that the meaning of the Constitution changes
over time depending on a larger social and political climate of opinion and
constitutional ethos. Balkin's principal comparison is between Lochner and
another prominent member of the constitutional anti-canon, Plessy v.
Ferguson.7 The New Deal story in which Lochner was wrongly decided from
the start has not persisted down to this day, Balkin said. On the other hand, the
Civil Rights Revolution story, in which Plessy was wrongly decided, is still
going strong. Jack Balkin sidestepped the objection that his historicist position
would disable him from ever saying that any Supreme Court decision was
incorrectly decided - or was not the inevitable product of prevailing ideas and
arguments - on the day it was decided.
FEDERALISM

Lynn Baker's concern, in the second paper presented at this conference, was
with federalism. 8 Baker recounted the recent, little-known Pierce County v.
Guillen decision, 9 in which Baker had participated as amicus curiae. A
unanimous Supreme Court upheld in Guillen, over Baker's objection, a federal
statute that afforded an evidentiary privilege for highway safety information
collected by states and localities. Baker had argued that this federal statute
interfered with state sovereignty. Distant as this might seem from the concerns
of Lochner v. New York, Baker explained that what she called three "Lochnerbased concerns" motivated five Justices who usually support states' rights to
vote against that position. These concerns are: (1) a worry about the Court's
institutional incompetence to make policy judgments about such things as what
constitutes interstate commerce; (2) a view that "political safeguards of
federalism"' 0 in the constitutional structure make it unnecessary for the
Supreme Court to protect states; and (3) a normative constitutional value
system that prefers individual personal and cultural liberties over economic
6 Jack M. Balkin,
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Liability, 20 URn. LAW. 301 (1988).
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liberties and states' rights. Lochner's three lessons, as Baker sets them forth,
are by no means the lessons taught by Justice Peckham's majority opinion in
Lochner. Rather, they are the lessons drawn from the solid phalanx of critics
of the Lochner decision from 1905 onward. In arguing against these concerns,
Baker focused on the centrality, in both Guillen and Lochner, of the question
of what a statute was about. In Lochner, the New York legislature said that its
statute was about health, and the Supreme Court disagreed. In Guillen, the
Supreme Court characterized the federal statute at issue as a highway safety
regulation, while Baker saw it as an interference with the traditional states' role
in setting their own rules of evidence.
CIVIL RIGHTS

Pamela Karlan put Lochner in the context of civil rights enforcement."
Karlan reminded us that the constitutional text applied in Lochner, the
Fourteenth Amendment, was intended, like its companion Thirteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, to safeguard newly freed former slaves and not Utica
bakeshop owners. Karlan paired Lochner with a case decided just one year
later, Hodges v. United States,12 in which liberty of contract was incorporated
into the Thirteenth Amendment's protection against the badges and incidents
of slavery. The case arose when white sawmill employers secured a federal
indictment against white employees for intimidating black employees and
attempting to drive the black employees away from their jobs at the sawmill.
Did the Thirteenth Amendment give the federal government power to secure to
former slaves the same liberty of contract employers enjoyed in Lochner, this
time against private parties' interference? The government argued that it did,
but the Supreme Court shrank the Thirteenth Amendment to an abstract
prohibition against the formal institution of slavery. Lochner, in Karlan's
telling, was of a piece with Plessy v. Ferguson and Hodges v. United States in
retreating from the promise of racial justice intended by the post-Civil War
amendments. Formal freedom won, and practical freedom lost.
POLITICAL CONTEXT

Keith Whittington, the political scientist among the paper presenters,
answered the question: How typical was Lochner v. New York compared to the
rest of the Supreme Court docket in the fifteen years before and after the
Lochner decision? 13 Lochner invalidated a state statute, but Whittington chose
to count and to explain Supreme Court review of federal statutes in this thirty
year period. He set forth a theoretical model, building on the work of Robert

" Pamela S. Karlan, Contracting the Thirteenth Amendment: Hodges v. United States,
85 B.U. L. REv. 783 (2005).
12 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
13 Keith E. Whittington, Congress Before the Lochner Court, 85 B.U. L. REv. 821

(2005).
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Dahl and Mark Graber, in which the Supreme Court would never be expected
to invalidate a statute enacted by a strong, broadly-shared political majority. In
this model, Supreme Court justices belong to a political elite presumed to share
the same views as the dominant political coalition at the time of their
appointment. Since the Lochner Court was a Republican court in a period of
Republican ascendancy, Whittington showed that the Court left more
legislation standing than it invalidated, and that when federal statutes were
struck down (e.g., the income tax and child labor regulation), or drastically
limited (e.g. the antitrust statute), particular political compromises had formed
weak or fleeting majorities to get them enacted. Populist and Progressive Era
legislation was not really what the Republican elite wanted, and when such
compromises were enacted the Supreme Court was happy to invalidate them.
It was not until 1934 to 1936 that the Supreme Court engaged in a broad
campaign against federal government regulation informed by a constitutional
vision at odds with the President and strong majorities in Congress.
Whittington did not make Lochner's countermajoritarian difficulty disappear
entirely, but he did much to reduce the Supreme Court's role during most of
that era to politics as usual.
REVISIONISM RE-REVISED

Barry Cushman, in the final paper of the conference, endeavored to
14
complicate the simple stories of both opponents and proponents of Lochner.
Once upon a time, Lochner represented, to its enemies, a Supreme Court
majority's embrace of a highly-contested ideology of Social Darwinism and
laissez -faire economics. Holmes himself, in his famous dissent, identified
these as the twin sources of the majority's error.1 5 Then came the inexorable
revisionism.
According to Cushman, Howard Gillman 16 replaced this
longstanding critique with a new orthodoxy that the Supreme Court in Lochner
and cases like it was merely giving effect to a principle of neutrality by which
the Court struck down class legislation that had been secured improperly by
bakery employees, laundry women, and other such powerful special interests.
This revisionism had itself been challenged by younger scholars who took at
face value the Lochner Court's invocation of individual liberty and autonomy
constitutionally protected against government regulation. Cushman argued
that Gillman's neutrality principle held considerable force in a number of cases
not considered by Gillman's critics. He showed that a surprising large number
14 Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L. REv. 881

(2005).
15 "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics....
[A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism ...or of laissez-faire." Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
16 Howard Gillman attended the conference, and his comment addresses Keith
Whittington's paper with sidelights as well on the Cushman paper. Howard Gillman, DeLochnerizing Lochner, 85 B.U. L. REv. 859 (2005).

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 85:671

of rate regulation and price regulation statutes had come under Supreme Court
scrutiny on the precise charge of class legislation. Cushman complicated all
our stories of Lochner's lessons by reminding us that the U.S. Supreme Court
had then, as it has now, nine distinctly different intellectual biographies.
CONCLUSION

These five conference papers may have a common thread, expressed in
different ways and to different extents, that courts, scholars and students are
not as outraged at Lochner v. New York now as they had been decades ago.
Whether Lochner-like challenges to the modem regulatory state are dead and
gone, as Jack Balkin's paper suggested, or are just gaining momentum again,
remains to be seen. Perhaps only legal historians of a certain age can feel
outrage nowadays at a hundred-year-old case. Each of the papers in this
conference attracted learned commentators and lively questions. A gathering
of so many constitutional law professors in one place inevitably led to some
playing of the "I can name a Supreme Court case that the rest of you don't
know" game. But nobody called for constitutional revolution or coup d'etat.
Lochner, it seems, is only turning over in its grave. What Lochner sparks, at
its centenary, is not a reanimated corpse at all but these fresh, notable, and
interesting contributions to the scholarship of law, politics, and the
Constitution. We hope that you enjoy them.

